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Estilo

«- Se eu quisesse, enlouquecia. Sei uma quantidade de histórias terríveis. Vi muita coisa, contaram-me casos extraordinários, eu próprio… Enfim, Às vezes já não consigo arrumar tudo isso. Porque, sabe?, acorda-se às quatro da manhã num quarto vazio, acende-se um cigarro… Está a ver? A pequena luz do fósforo levanta de repente a massa das sombras, a camisa caída sobre a cadeira ganha um volume impossível, a nossa vida… compreende?… a nossa vida, a vida inteira, está ali como… como um acontecimento excessivo… Tem de se arrumar muito depressa. Há felizmente o estilo. Não calcula o que seja? Vejamos: o estilo é um modo subtil de transferir a confusão e a violência da vida para o plano mental de uma unidade de significação. Faço-me entender? Não? Bem, não aguentamos a desordem estuporada da vida. E então pegamos nela, reduzimo-lo a dois ou três tópicos que se equacionam. Depois, por meio de uma operação intelectual, dizemos que esses tópicos se encontram no tópico comum, suponhamos, do Amor ou da Morte. Percebe? Uma dessas abstracções que servem para tudo. O cigarro consome-se, não é?, a calma volta. Mas pode imaginar o que seja isto todas as noites, durante semanas ou meses ou anos?

Uma vez fui a um médico.
– Doutor, estou louco – disse. – Devo estar louco.
– Tem loucos na família? – perguntou o médico. – Alcoólicos, sifilíticos?
– Sim, senhor. O pior. Loucos, alcoólicos, sifilíticos, místicos, prostitutas, homossexuais. Estarei louco?
O médico tinha sentido de humor, e receitou-me barbitúricos.
– Não preciso de remédios – disse eu. – Sei histórias tenebrosas acerca da vida. De que me serve barbitúricos?

A verdade é que eu ainda não havia encontrado o estilo. Mas ouça, meu amigo: conheço por exemplo a história de um homem velho. Conheço também a de um homem novo. A do velho é melhor, pois era muito velho, e que poderia ele esperar? Mas veja, preste bem atenção. Esse homem velhíssimo não se resignaria nunca a prescindir do amor. Amava as flores. No meio da sua solidão tinha vasos de orquídeas.

O mundo é assim, que quer? É forçoso encontrar um estilo. Seria bom colocar grandes cartazes nas ruas, fazer avisos na televisão e nos cinemas. Procure o seu estilo, se não quer dar em pantanas. Arranjei o meu estilo estudando matemática e ouvindo um pouco de música. – João Sebastião Bach. Conhece o Concerto Brandeburguês n.º 5? Conhece com certeza essa coisa tão simples, tão harmoniosa e definitiva que é um sistema de três equações e três incógnitas. Primário, rudimentar. Resolvi milhares de equações. Depois ouvia Bach. Consegui um estilo. Aplico-o à noite quando acordo às quatro da madrugada. É simples: quando acordo aterrorizado, vendo as grandes sombras incompreensíveis erguerem-se no meio do quarto, quando a pequena luz se faz na ponta dos dedos, e toda a imensa melancolia do mundo parece subir do sangue com a sua voz obscura… Começo a fazer o meu estilo. Admirável exercício, este.
(…)»
Herberto Helder, Os Passos em Volta (Assírio e Alvim), pp. 9-11


Sortir des mathématiques? oui, c’est possible!

PROGRESSISTES, Science, Travail & Environnement

Manifeste du 1er Avril 2015, initié par la revue Progressistes

IL FAUT SORTIR DES MATHEMATIQUES

Les mathématiques : un bilan désastreux

Chaque jours, des milliers d’informations traversent les océans afin d’optimiser les opérations financières des bourses du monde entier. Chaque jour des supercalculateurs traitent des millions d’opérations : addition, multiplication,division, dérivé, intégration, probabilités…Toutes ces opérations servent les grandes multinationales de la planète pour licencier et détruire l’environnement. Les mathématiques ont un bilan effroyable : de l’esclavage, car elles ont permis la navigation intercontinentale des navires transportant les africains (repérage dans l’océan sur la base d’observation d’étoiles), aux grandes guerres mondiales, dont les allemands ont fait un usage massif pour développer leurs armes modernes…on ne compte plus les morts dus aux mathématiques.

Comment éviter cela ?

Certains « experts » représentant le lobby des livres de mathématiques, tentent de convaincre les populations que les mathématiques sont contrôlables et peuvent être au…

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Conspiranóia

“We need to fight conspiracism wherever we find it. I can’t emphasise this enough. There is a lot of work debunking this or that conspiracy theory, but nowhere near enough serious work analysing the ideology of conspiracism (the idea that all of world history is down to a few blokes twirling their well-waxed moustaches in a smoky room someplace) and examining the corners it originates in.

in a society where people are depoliticised and unsatisfied, conspiracism is an extremely attractive nuisance. People are looking for some alternative to what they rightly recognise as bullshit in the papers and on TV, something that matches their experience of feeling powerless at the hands of rich, powerful people who are feathering their own nests. Conspiracism seems to provide that.

I have spent a lot of time studying conspiracism first hand in various places, and I came to the conclusion some time ago that conspiracism is the default analytical mode of fascism. Every fascist and reactionary ideology or regime has had some form of conspiracism, from the backlash against the French Revolution to the fascists of the 1930s and 1940s. It is also interesting how few links you have to click in order to go from “9/11 was an inside job” or “chemtrails” or the like to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and openly neo-Nazi material. Sometimes, you don’t even have to leave the site.

Conspiracism has a cult-like dynamic that sets up anyone who questions or doubts it as either one of the “sheeple” (a “sherson”, perhaps?) or, as one person once claimed about me “in the pay of the shadows”. Because of this, once someone takes the bait on one of the “gateway drugs” like 9/11 “truth” etc., they will many times tend to start believing more and more of it, until one gets to the openly racist “theories” that are never too far from the surface.

To me, this is an area where we have a lot of work to do. These “theories” are being pushed by fascists, and they are succesfful far too frequently for comfort. We need a clear understanding of the dangers of this ideology and of the importance of calling it out (including pointing out its origins) and debunking it and exposing its pernicious consequences, and a practise of combating it wherever we find it. We trivialise this problem at our own risk.”  Elise Hendrick

http://skepoet.wordpress.com/2013/02/16/interview-with-elise-hendrick-on-liberal-naivete-and-entryism/

Ver também: https://www.facebook.com/notes/elise-hendrick/am-i-ever-gonna-see-your-face-again-conspiracist-edition/10151094842447876


Will the Real Holocaust Deniers Please Stand Up?

 

I have long believed that discussions of the Holocaust focused far too much

attention on the murderous activities of the Germans and their pro-Nazi Axis

accomplices, while neglecting the complicity of the Allied ‘United Nations’

and neutral governments. True, the Nazis, abetted by their French, Croat,

Hungarian and other collaborators, performed the actual ethnic cleansing by

rounding up the Jews, seizing their property, and shipping them off to the

concentration-camps and the death-ovens – setting the example for today’s

Serb and Croat Red-Brown dictatorships to imitate. But Hitler’s dream of a

Judenrein (“cleansed of Jews”) Europe could not have been achieved without

the complicity of the U.S., Britain, Russia, Switzerland, the Vatican, et al. –

any more than Milosevic’s and Tudjman’s dreams of ethnically cleansed

Yugoslavia today.

 

I use the world “complicity” not in some vague, passive, moral sense, but in

the strict judicial sense. For the neutral and Allied governments were witting

accomplices before, during and after the fact of Nazi war crimes against the

humanity – and what is more, accomplices who shared in the spoils of money

and property stolen from the Jews! Consider the following: 1. The Allied

governments were accomplices before the Holocaust in that they

systematically shut their doors to the persecuted Jews of Germany and the

Nazi-occupied territories who had legitimate grounds for seeking asylum under

international law. 2. The Allies were accomplices during the Holocaust in that

they systematically hid the knowledge of the death-camps, thus lulling the

Jews into believing the Nazi cover-story of “labor camps” and enabling the

Hitlerites to round up their ignorant victims “like sheep.” 3. The Allies were

accomplices after the Holocaust in that they systematically helped the Nazi

war criminals to escape with part of the booty they looted from the Jews, while

hiding their own part of the booty in secret vaults where the Jewish survivors

could not claim it. Please allow me to develop these three deliberately

provocative accusations in more detail:(163)

 

1) Jewish Exclusion By refusing the Jews (and left anti-fascists) asylum, the

foreign offices of Britain, the U.S. and their dependencies in Latin America

deliberately condemned millions to persecution and eventual death.(164) These

governments uniformly refused to recognize Hitler’s persecutions (including

the murder of anti-fascists and other non-Jews) as an international emergency.

Instead, they punctiliously enforced the most absurd provisions of their

immigration codes and visa requirements. The notorious anti-Semitism of the

classes from which Western diplomats were then recruited does not suffice to

explain the systematic rejection of these useful and otherwise inoffensive

refugees. Although the diplomats’ vile upper-class caddishness was given free

rein, the racist policy decisions were made at the top for reasons of state,

racism being the health of the capitalist state.

 

This closed-door policy of the capitalist democracies faced with Hitler’s

campaign to create a “Jew-free” Reich during 1933-1945 was historically

unique and a direct cause of the “Final Solution.” After all, there was nothing

new or original in Hitler’s plan to scapegoat the Jews, persecute them, steal

their property, and then get rid of them, leaving his Empire free of Jews. The

Fürher was only following in the noble footsteps of European sovereigns over

the centuries. In 1290, King Edward banished all Jews from England… In

1306, Philip IV expelled all Jews from France, seizing their property and

money owed them… In 1492 Ferdinand and Isabella celebrated their marriage

and the unity of the Spanish monarchy by expelling the Jews, and so on…

However, previous to 1933-1945 other states had always been found willing to

welcome the fleeing Jewish refugee populations, if only to use them, squeeze

them, and expel them subsequently. The unique difference in 1933-1940 was

the democracies’ systematic refusal to follow tradition, leaving Hitler little

choice but to introduce the “Final Solution.”

 

2) Holocaust denial. By systematically ignoring, downplaying and keeping

secret a multitude of reliable intelligence reports and survivors’ tales

establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the death-camps, the

Allied governments aided and abetted Hitler’s maniacal crimes. Churchill,

Roosevelt and Stalin were thus the original “negationists” whose denial of the

Holocaust while it was happening enabled it to happen. There is no question

that they “knew.”

 

Although Roosevelt issued an order to his staff not to show him any documents

concerning the Holocaust (Nixon didn’t invent ‘plausible denial’) and turned a

deaf ear to Eleanor’s pleas for Jewish and anti-fascist refugees (among them

Victor Serge), the other Allied governments officially acknowledged the fact

Holocaust… And proceeded to do nothing to stop it. Nonetheless, on 24

August 1941, Radio Moscow transmitted the Appeal of the Soviet Jews: “The

very existence of the Jewish people is today in doubt.” On July 1, 1942 Jean

Marin talked about “gas chambers” on the Free French radio broadcasting from

London. Finally, in December 1942, a declaration was signed by eleven Allied

governments and the Free French Committee: ‘The German authorities are

carrying out Hitler’s often repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people

in Europe.’ (165) How widely was this epochal news circulated? In 1945, when

the camps were finally liberated, the G.I.s and accompanying journalists saw

the extent of the horror, they were totally incredulous. Nothing had prepared

them for what they stumbled into on their advance through Germany and

Poland.

 

All the justifiable furor over the post-facto scribblings of negationist

‘historians’ like Fourisson and his miserable defenders ironically serves to

cloud the issue of the active complicity of the negationist governments and

statesmen during the commission of the actual, and preventable, crimes against

humanity. Instead of daring the raise the question of the guilt of Hitler’s

international accomplices, journalists and scholars touch at most on the

question, “what could they have done?” The answer is: “a great deal.” The

conventional arguments over whether bombing the camps and the rails leading

to them would have “diverted” planes from “important military targets” are

hardly worth considering in the light of the useless bombing of Dresden. In any

case, it was not by withholding the bombers but by withholding the truth that

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin ultimately condemned the European Jews to

destruction.

 

It takes only a little historical imagination to picture what might have happened

if the Allies had systematically used their radio, airdrop leaflet and

underground propaganda apparatus to spread the word about the death camps

among East European Jewry. By 1943, London was crawling with escaped

Jews clamoring to tell their authentic stories in Yiddish and every language of

Nazi-occupied Europe reached by Allied broadcasts and propaganda.

Assuming the word reached only half the Jews and was believed by only half

of them, the effort would still have resulted in a minimum of one million who

could have hidden, run away, perhaps armed themselves and resisted. Now

imagine the problems that a million refractory Jews would have created for

Nazi administrators like Eichmann, whose vast and minutely-organized

roundup operations depended on his victims’ near-total passivity and

cooperation. Apparently Eichmann had only a couple of hundred troops in his

command. Imagine the diversionary effect on the Nazi war effort if troops had

to be systematically diverted to hunt down, round up and guard these Jews.

 

But why not take this perfectly likely scenario one step further? Among the

million-odd European Jews who might have heard and believed the truth about

the fate Hitler had in store for them if the Allies hadn’t deliberately kept it from

them, there would have been a certain percentage who would have attempted

not just to escape, but to resist – as they finally did in the Warsaw Ghetto. For

if many European Jews were a-political, pious and passive (like their non-

Jewish counterparts), there were also plenty of hot-headed teenagers, Zionists,

Bundists, Socialists, veterans of the First World War ready and able to fight.

And if the Jewish resistance trapped in the Warsaw ghetto was able to inflict

real harm on the Nazis with homemade weapons, what might a Jewish

Resistance have accomplished if coordinated, supported and supplied by the

Allies like the French, Italian, Yugoslav and other Resistance movements

were?

 

There is nothing absurd about this notion. After all, the U.S. wartime OSS

(Office of Strategic Services: predecessor of the CIA) went to great lengths to

recruit its officers among such unlikely groups as labor agitators, Communists,

Spanish Civil War veterans in order to drop them behind the Nazi lines and

link up with their counterparts in the local maquis. So why didn’t they send

anti-fascist American Jews to help the Jews to resist? The sad fact is that the

idea never occurred even, for example, to the Jews who were active in the

French Resistance itself.

 

Forget, for a moment, the number of Jews who might have been saved by such

a policy. Just think of the diversion it would have caused behind the Axis lines

and of the number of Allied lives that might have been saved. And this at the

minimal cost of extending to the Jews the same programs of propaganda and

strategic support services the Allies aimed at stirring up the other peoples of

occupied Europe; indeed at the “cost” of NOT suppressing the truth of the

horrors of Nazism in the case of the Jews!

 

Excuse me for insisting at length on this point. The veil of “military

expediency” has always concealed what seemed to me the blatant guilt of the

Allies what is usually perceived as their “failure to help the Jews.” But if

military expediency dictated sparing Allied lives and materiel by encouraging

the resistance of the Jews with the same cynicism with which the OSS

encouraged the resistance of the Communists, the Gaullists, the Mafia, the

Poles and tutti quanti, then the truth behind the veil is revealed. The truth is the

predominance of Allied anti-Semitism and the complicity in Hitler’s genocidal

crimes of the original Holocaust deniers, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin and their

aids.

 

3) After the fact: hiding the criminals and sharing the loot. It has now

become general knowledge that the Vatican and the Allied Occupation forces

and intelligence services (principally the OSS/CIA) conspired with neo-Nazi

and anti-Communist networks throughout Europe and Latin American to

organize the famous “rat-lines” which enabled thousands of notorious Nazi

war-criminals to escape prosecution and reach safe havens. Indeed, the charge

that the democratic governments were Nazi accomplices after the fact of the

Shoah is barely controversial, since in recent years retired Allied intelligence

officers have willingly told their tales, either out of guilt or in order to justify

coddling Nazi war criminals as recruits in the anti-Communist crusade.

 

We now know how the “rat-lines” network systematically sought out Nazi warcriminals

concealed under aliases in the teeming displaced persons camps, hid

them in churches and monasteries, got them visas and false papers, organized

their escape to Latin America, and employed them as advisors and agents. For

example in training the torturers employed by the right-wing Argentinean junta

and then loaned to the CIA to train the Nicaraguan Contras. So it is hardly a

surprise that the world had to wait until most of the criminals had died natural

deaths before learning how carefully and for how long they were protected.

 

The more shocking revelations of 1997 concerned the disposal of the booty the

Nazi killers looted from the Jews they murdered. Not only did the Swiss banks

knowingly welcome Nazi deposits that probably included gold from the teeth

of death-camp victims, the banks also systematically concealed from the

Jewish survivors and their relatives the records of their wartime holdings in

order to embezzle the money for their own profit. Financial institutions in the

U.S., Britain, and Sweden also profited by concealing confiscated Jewish

wealth during the post-War period when Jewish Holocaust survivors continued

to suffer and die on the road or in Allied displaced person camps for lack of

money to pay for food and medicine. Hanna Arendt coined the phrase “the

banality of evil” to describe the personality and activity of Nazi bureaucrats

like Adolf Eichmann.

 

Looking soberly at the chaotic picture of half-destroyed Europe in the months

after the victory of “democracy” over “Nazism,” one almost has the impression

that the Allies set out to finish the extermination job begun by Hitler. Indeed,

in post-war Poland, thousands of returning Jewish survivors were murdered

and despoiled with impunity. Jewish camp survivors wandered Europe for

years as starving and homeless as DP’s (Displaced Persons) with no support

from the Allied governments and little charity from U.S. Jewish congregations,

which had done little or nothing before and during the Holocaust for fear of

bucking the government and attracting unfavorable attention to themselves,

returning Jewish survivors.(166) On the one hand we see the Nazi victimizers

rescued, coddled, and helped to flee; on the other the Jewish victims despoiled,

neglected, persecuted, confined and forcibly prevented from fleeing to

Palestine.

 

Why do I feel so particularly outraged, indignant and angry over all this

particular hypocrisy? I had grown up believing that WWII was fought to defeat

fascism and save the Jews from Hitler. At home, they worshiped Roosevelt. In

my little bed I imagined the Allies were protecting me and other Jewish

children against the ultimate Bad Guys. Then I learned the truth. We were

betrayed. World War II was ending as when learning to read and learn about

the world. Only once did I dare glimpsed a photo in a book of skeletal Jews in

striped pajamas as a little kid. After that, I walked carefully around the place

that book was kept. But my parents read papers and magazines like The Nation

and the left-wing National Guardian, and our daily paper was the independent

(no ads) P.M. whose star reporter was I. F. Stone, my hero and role model and

a family friend. In 1946, he covered the refugee story and wrote a sensational

book Underground to Palestine describing the plight of the homeless Jews in a

heartless world. Also the Negroes: P.M. was the only paper that regularly

covered the lynching of returning African-American G.I.s that was taking

place all over the South. They got betrayed too. All this was discussed over

endless cups of coffee (mine mostly milk) in our kitchen, and as they say, little

pitchers have big ears.

 

At that time N.Y. Post, which most liberal Jewish NYers read, was violently

anti-German, forgetting that Hitler had sent the all the German Socialists,

Communists, trade-unionists and anarchists to the concentration camps before

he hit on the Jews. This was the theory of “collective guilt” which Victor Serge

satirizes in his novel Unforgiving Years. Then, a few years later, suddenly the

‘Good’ Germans were on our side against the nasty Russians and nobody

talked about the thousands of Nazi administrators, profiteers, torturers, judges,

police chiefs, professors who escaped the quickly-curtailed Nuremberg war

crimes trials and were now back administering, judging, policing and

professing, if not torturing.

 

I was eight, when the Jewish State was declared in Palestine. I learned that

Jews could fight for themselves. Their cry was “Never again like sheep to the

slaughter!” Sounded good. But how do you avoid going like a sheep when the

whole world – including the democracies and the established European Jewish

leadership – is telling you that the slaughter-house is a rest-home for sheep?

Alas, many of these false leaders, these Judas goats, became prominent in

Israel, as did the hardcore right wing Zionists who were ready to collaborate

with Hitler to get more Jews into Palestine. So that even Israel, for political

purposes, is involved in the denial of Allied complicity in the Holocaust.

 

If my voice sounds hoarse in this article, it’s because I want to shout the truth

from the housetops: put not your faith in princes!

 

 

163 Everyone interested in this question should start with Arthur D. Morse’s

pioneering exposé While Six Million Died: A chonicle of American Apathy.

164 Imagine the effect of post-war economic development of the South

American republics if their governments had taken in a couple of million

Jewish engineers, businessmen, teachers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, skilled

bakers, jewelers, tailors and mechanics. Within a generation or two, this leaven

of European technical and entrepreneurial skill would have enabled Latin

Americans to free themselves from dependency on the U.S., climb out of

poverty and develop modern capitalist economies.

165 Denis Peschanski, “Extermination des juifs: que savait Vichy?” Nouvel

observateur Sept. 18, 1997

166 I am not making this up. The official commemorative histories of local

congregations which I have perused in West Hartford and Philadelphia while

visiting relatives both explicitly express regret and embarrassment at their

temple’s inaction during the Holocaust years.

 

Richard Greeman, Vegetarian Sharks.


Schindler’s List or E.T. Goes to Auschwitz

 Good intentions don’t necessarily make good movies. Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List was inspired by the director’s revulsion at ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and other forms of racism. His highly acclaimed film about the fate of Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland couldn’t have come at a better time what with so-called “revisionist” historians denying the reality of the Holocaust and gaining credibility. Spielberg’s moving story and vivid images will bring the reality of the systematic destruction of European Jewry home to millions of viewers, not only in the U.S. but also in Germany and East Europe, where the subject has been taboo for fifty years. Yet if Schindler’s List has all the power of a major Hollywood production, Spielberg’s deeply flawed film also embodies Hollywood’s failings.

Schindler’s List is based on the true story of Oskar Schindler, a Nazi businessman who saved 1100 Jews from the gas chambers. He did by employing them as slave laborers in an enterprise originally capitalized by squeezing money out of ghettoized Jews in Cracow, Poland. The exceptional story of the emergence of Schindler’s underlying decency and of his remarkable success in beating the Nazi system deserves to be told. Schindler’s List will certainly be seen by millions who will never be exposed to gritty documentaries like Shoah and The Sorrow and the Pity. With its happy ending and its focus on an identifiable Everyman character, Spielberg’s film is able to confront mass audiences with a subject so horrifying as to be quite literally unbelievable.

But does Schindler’s List truly succeed in awakening its mass audience to the reality of the Holocaust experience? Alas, in curious, but quite specific ways Spielberg’s film actually invites its audience to deny that reality.

The Holocaust, a “Myth”?

To begin with, the film explicitly fails to contradict the revisionist thesis that Nazi’s use of gas chambers at Auschwitz for mass extermination of Jews is a “myth.” The first mention of the gas chambers in the film is a rumor, which Schindler’s Jewish women refuse to believe: “Why kill us?” they reason. “We are valuable workers for the German war effort.” Then, as the film reaches its climax, these women, whose lives the audience had considered “saved” (Schindler had bought them from the Nazis), are shipped to Auschwitz by mistake. Our expectations are suddenly reversed. We witness the horror of the train entering the Death Camp… Night and fog, dogs and searchlights. The shaved heads of naked, terrified women herded into sealed chambers marked “Bath-Disinfectant.” Hysterical farewell embraces: the terrible rumor was apparently true. As we watch and listen in horror, the shower-heads begin to hiss, and out comes – water! Fresh, cool, life-giving water to soothe and cleanse the parched throats and bruised bodies after the slave-labor camps and the cattle-cars.

This stunning anti-climax is never explained, and the audience is only too glad to have been spared the horror. Next morning, Schindler arrives like John Wayne and rescues “his” Jewish women for the second time. As the women reembark on the train to safety, we get glimpses of dead bodies and smoking chimneys. Viewers who already believe in the gas chambers are free to imagine what they believe. So are Holocaust-deniers, who are free to imagine that the bodies represent workers who died of disease and the smoke from the chimneys comes from the factory. Nothing has been shown but a shower-bath. At the heart of Spielberg’s darkness there is – avoidance.

After this central anti-climax, his film has no place to go but down, and it wallows in bathos for the next un-dramatic hour or so. We are treated to endless scenes of tearful re-uniting, lip-quivering gratitude, and heroic modesty with “Schindler’s Jews” (they are never referred to otherwise) standing around their Gentile savior in carefully choreographed groups with dumb grins on their faces, like the Munchkins after Dorothy has saved them from the Wicked Witch. The audience walks out numbed as if they had attended a B’nai Brith Awards Ceremony minus the boiled chicken.

The Jews of Silence

Even during the first half of the film, which is far more dramatic and historically grounded, “Schindler’s Jews” are never developed as characters. Jews are depicted merely as objects of Schindler”s benevolence or as victim’s of the Nazi’s cruelty. There is no space in Spielberg’s very long film for developed dialogues between Jewish husbands and wives or Jewish parents and children. Indeed, Spielberg’s Jewish “characters” only get to speak when they are spoken to – by Nazi officials or by Schindler himself. The actors are reduced to speaking lines like “Ja, Herr Direktor” or later, tearfully and gratefully: “God bless you, Herr Direktor.” Rarely do we hear Jews talk to each other.

 The two exceptions to this rule are themselves remarkable for their curious ambiguity. One is the scene, cited above, where a Jewish woman passes on a rumor about the gas chambers to her companions and is disbelieved. In the other, a circle of idle Jewish men are shown schmoozing in a Krakow street, having just been herded into the ghetto and deprived of their occupations. They conclude that “Here, we are free.” Again, at the heart of darkness – avoidance.

Visually, too, Spielberg focalizes his Jews almost exclusively through Schindler’s Gentile eyes. For example, we look down with Schindler and his mistress (on horseback) from a cliff high above the Krakow ghetto as we watch the SS round up the Jews for the camps. Although the film is shot in black and white to give it a documentary flavor, during this scene the dress of one little Jewish girl is tinted red, which enables the audience, looking down with Schindler, to follow her individual fate during the roundup. Later, we see the red dress again through Schindler’s eyes as the child’s body is dragged by on a cart at Auschwitz while Schindler is loading “his” Jewish girls on the rescue train. Thus does Spielberg “individualize” Jews.

To be sure, during the scenes of the SS roundup of the ghetto Jews, we are shown a few examples of Jews taking action to save themselves. However, they are soon captured and brutally killed. In Spielberg’s Krakow there is no salvation outside of Schindler’s list (although in real life, some Jews did resist and even survive).

The visual and auditory messages are clear. There are two types of Jews: passive victims of the Nazis and passive benefactors of Schindler. The Jewish “characters” barely even rise to the level of stereotypes, their main function being to act as stand-ins for the actual names on the real-life Schindler’s list. There is hardly a need for actors (as opposed to extras) in this production, although Ben Kingsley struggles manfully with the ungrateful role of the grateful Itzhak Stern, Schindler’s Jewish accountant and reluctant confidant.

Indeed, Spielberg dispenses with actors and actually shows us the real-life survivors at the end of his film. A dozen of Schindler’s Jews, most of them in their eighties today, file by the real-dead Schindler’s grave, smiling and grateful and above all silent. As the survivors place stones on the tomb, the audience reads subtitles proclaiming their names – remembered from the famous List. I suppose one could argue with the authenticity of this dubious shift from fiction-film to documentary, but I would gladly have accepted it if only, at long last, Speilberg had allowed some real-life Jews to speak for themselves! No wonder Claude Lanzmann, whose documentary Shoah is made up entirely of first-person survivor narratives, protested Schindler’s List.

Schindler Unmasked

Schindler alone is active in Spielberg’s film. He is the omnipotent entrepreneur who pits his capitalist skills against the omnipotent SS and wins: first by piling up a fortune exploiting Jewish slave-labor, then by keeping his business going in the face of the “final solution,” eventually by rescuing his Jewish workers.

In Spielberg’s fable, the capitalist ethic is thus depicted ambiguously as saving humanity, or at least a remnant of Jewish humanity. To his great credit, Spielberg also shows us the larger reality, which is the fact that the camps were all slave-labor enterprises run at a profit for German businesses. What the film perhaps cannot be expected to show is the big picture – that Nazism was the final solution to the crisis of German capitalism. (*) To be sure, Spielberg’s film makes tricking the Nazis look almost easy: a little bribe here, some psychology there and voilà! Of course, Schindler is as much a con artist as an entrepreneur, but he soon has the sinister SS buffaloed much as in the world of TV Hogan’s Heroes pull the wool over the eyes of their cute dumb German captors.

This is the level on which Spielberg’s film fails to convince both as document and as drama. Like Hogan’s Heroes, Spielberg’s Jews remain fat and relatively well-dressed throughout World War Two! They look nothing like the photographs of skeletal concentration camps survivors that horrified those of us who were alive in 1945 when the camps were liberated and which continue to shock today. In Spielberg’s sanitized “ET Goes to Auschwitz” version of the Holocaust, Schindler’s Jews are not even believable victims.

Thus, during the final self-congratulatory sequences set in Czechoslovakia, where Schindler has managed to install “his” Jews in a factory in his home town, the Jewish extras appear as chubby and grateful as the happy slaves on Scarlett O’Hara’s plantation. In these crowd scenes Spielberg’s well-fleshed extras are shown massed, Hollywood style, like Dorothy’s Munchkins. Why didn’t Spielberg, that stickler for visual authenticity, bother to hire out-of-work actors with AIDS as extras? After all, they used real midgets in The Wizard of Oz.

Even the extras’ costumes fail to convince us they have endured five years in the camps. Their “slave” outfits look as fresh as if they had just been sewn by the mothers of the Hollywood Hills Jewish Center for their children’s’ Passover Pageant. No wonder there wasn’t a wet eye in the house, when I saw Schindler at the East Hartford shopping mall Cinemas.

Even the character of Schindler, whom Spielberg does attempt to develop as an individual, gets spoiled and sentimentalized in these concluding scenes. Throughout the film Schindler had appeared as an opaque figure, a cynical bon-vivant who, having consciously chosen to make his fortune out of war and slave-labor, inexplicably stops short of implicating himself in the ultimate Nazi horror and chooses to invest part of his profits in bribes to save the workers who have made him rich. The poker-face he uses to deal with the SS is an ideal mask to conceal his motives from the audience and create a totally credible character whose singular aura is enhanced by mystery.

Then Spielberg throws it all away by having Schindler remove his mask before his final getaway. While his chorus of grateful Jews masses around his waiting Mercedes, Schindler breaks down blubbering about how many more Jews he might have saved if only he had drunk less Champagne! It is as if, at the end of Casablanca, Claude Rains, the Vichy Police Captain who saves Bogart, had begun beating his breast about how guilty he felt lining his pockets instead of exiting on the immortal line: “I am only a poor corrupt French official!” Alas, Schindler’s tear-jerking exit scene is more of a homage to Dorothy’s or to ET’s farewells than to Claude Rains’ and Bogie’s tight-lipped, cynical/sentimental departure from Casablanca.

Schindler’s weepy exit lines not only destroy him as a consistent character, they also undermine the logical premise of the plot by suddenly making it appear that this unscrupulous conman-cum-entrepreneur had secretly been nourishing some sort of benevolent plan all along! But only a cynical Schindler who had no scruples about spending his evenings wining and dining Nazi mass-murderers to win contracts could possibly have brought off this tour de force rescue under the very noses of the SS.

Spielberg’s sentimentalized Hollywood ending not only breaks with dramatic consistency, it also violates historical reality. According to Thomas Keneally, the author of the nonfiction novel on which Spielberg based his film, the real Schindler actually fled with a small fortune in jewels he had stashed away.

The final horrendous inaccuracy occurs after Schindler’s departure, when Schindler’s Jews march off into the sunset over the green fields of Czechoslovakia (now in Technicolor like the Munchkins after Dorothy drops out of grim, black-and-white Kansas and saves them). As the camera pans back, the music comes up in a magnificent chorale of triumph and liberation, sung in Hebrew. One imagines some traditional Jewish song or one born of the Holocaust, like the authentic camp song “Peatbog Soldiers.” But no! I immediately recognized the strains of “Jerusalem of Gold,” the stirring anthem commissioned in 1967 to celebrate the victory of the Israeli Defense Forces over the Arabs – a hymn familiar to anyone who has been a tourist in Israel or attended an Israel fundraiser. Let’s not even talk about the ideological twist this 1967 Zionist song gives to this story of the Holocaust – especially for the Jewish audience. Have Schindler’s Jews been transmogrified by Spielberg into Rabin’s Israelis?

One might also object to Spielberg’s exclusive focus on Jews as Holocaust victims, to the exclusion of the millions of Communists, Socialists, Gypsies, Christians, homosexuals and resistance fighters who were sent to the camps. But again, my quarrel is with the film Spielberg DID make, not the one he didn’t. To conclude: I had entered the theater with much trepidation, having grown up during the Holocaust, an American descendant of Krakow Jews and one who is easily upset by graphic movies. I left the theater dry-eyed, with a distinct taste of cold boiled chicken in my mouth.

* The true story of the real Schindler shows how one decent businessman was able to save 1100 Jews without losing his life, indeed while amassing a sizable fortune. It is good that Schindler be remembered and his story told. But Spielberg’s monocular and monopolist focalization on his fictional Schindler prevents the audience from asking the obvious question: why didn’t more German businessmen save more Jews? I’m sure in real life it was much more difficult than in the movies, but the fact remains that German businesses like I.G. Farben profited from the slave labor camps and calculated down to the last gram of bread what was necessary to keep their workers dying slowly enough to maintain profits until the weak were gassed and sent to the ovens to be replaced by ever-new supplies of Jewish labor. Every mark and pfennig was accounted for. No one but Schindler – who in any case was apparently a Czech, not a German, and more of a con-man than a capitalist – seems to have though to keep them alive, even for the value of their skills. Schindler tried to convince his business colleagues to follow his example and fails. Spielberg’s film thus depicts capitalism’s ethic as both complicit in the Holocaust and resisting it. One cannot ask for more.

Richard Greeman, in Beware of Vegetarian Sharks.


The Great Game (Oiseau-tempête)

Oiseau-tempête n°9 (summer 2002)
The Great Game (OT9, 2001)

Historical event

The attacks on New York and Washington constitute a major historical event. For the first time in its history, the North-American capitalist superpower was attacked domestically. Its territory is no longer untouchable, invulnerable. The chaos, insecurity, and fear that have followed express this power’s new weakness.

The end of the two blocs and of the Cold War has placed American capitalism in a new situation, that of being a unique dominant power. If earlier it justified its imperialist interventions ideologically by the struggle against communism and the defense of the “free world,” now everything is reduced to the status of police operations. The democratic ideological veil, which drew support from the rejection of communist totalitarianism, has been replaced by more fragile ideologies. The humanitarian cover story, already in bad odor after the Rwandan genocide and the “humanitarian war” in Kosovo, will take second place, behind the fight against “terrorism.

***
“For the Europe that is coming into being, the end of the inviolability of the “American umbrella” also creates a new situation. Despite the real interdependence of these two capitalist forces, conflicts of interest are apparent among the different national capitals. After fighting for control of oil resources (the Gulf War), after intervening on the European borders of the former Soviet empire (the Balkan wars), it is now the struggle for position in East Asia-in the triangle of conflict formed by China, Pakistan, and India-that is the order of the day. Russian hegemony over the export of Caspian oil is being contested by the intervention in Afghanistan and by the installation of the American army in the former Soviet republics of the region and in Pakistan.

Despite the complicit barking noises made by the European political class, the current conflict has very quickly shown itself to be an American war. European Capitalism is clearly in the rearguard of this geopolitical reorganization, apart from Great Britain, whose imperialist interests and military apparatus are intimately tied in with those of the United States. But, as could already be seen in the two earlier wars, the Europe’s military dependence on the United States reflects its political weakness, which no longer corresponds to its economic power. The new vulnerability of the United States makes this contradiction even more evident. What one could take for “tailism” and submission of the European capitalist centers rather expresses the need not to leave the field completely open to the United States. They are trying to preserve what remains of their imperialist interests with the Arab countries, even while being forced to split the expenses of the new situations that are being created.

Conspiracy Theories

Paranoid-conspiratorial approaches to history have made a vigorous reappearance on this occasion. What is outside our grasp is, however, not always organized in advance, according to a plan serving the interests of the powerful. As if everything that happens could be explained rationally starting from the rational requirements of the system ! In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the American military intervention appears to have been a response to the attack rather than the realization of an earlier plan. While it is true that the oil deposits of the region have long been a subject of oil-company planning, the war has nevertheless created new problems and disequilibria that now have to be dealt with. This is an example of how badly the contradictory movement of capitalism fits into conspiracy theories and police chief logic (Who profits from the crime ?). The rational means of the capitalist system can be employed for irrational ends. We have seen this in the course of the preceding century, and more recently as well, including in the United States itself with the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995.

Conspiracy theorizing is based on the idea that the state is a unified institution, intelligent, capable of rational planning and of regulating the evolution of capitalism. Such thinking is a caricature of the idea of the autonomy of politics. Perceptive witnesses from other barbaric epochs have already noted that a system incapable of mastering the contradictory consequences of its own reproduction cannot claim to master war and its consequences. Capitalism is an unstable system : war is in fact an aspect of its regulation and of the overcoming of its disequilibria and contradictions. Barbarism is part of it ; it is neither an accident nor an event necessarily provoked intentionally by political institutions.

Disorganization of the State and the New Terrorism

However, the malfunctions, internal divisions, even the complicity of the American secret services are no doubt not uninvolved with the attacks of 11 September. Like the state as a whole, the American state is crisscrossed by divisions and various conflicts of interest. An aggravating factor is the privatization and the subcontracting that have taken over all public services during the last few years, introducing temp work, flexibility, and disorganization. The secret services have not escaped this tendency, reinforced by the end of the Cold War. What is more, in the United States as elsewhere the secret services have connections with ultra-right organizations which, for their part, have for a long time been linked to nationalist Arab groups oriented towards the idea of an anti-American anti-imperialist front.

Terrorism has changed. The collapse of the Soviet bloc brought with it a disequilibration of terror, which had been directed, well or poorly, by rival secret services in a well-established and negotiable framework. What official discourse today calls “terrorism” has nothing to do with the armed actions of groups animated by state-socialist ideology and by anti-imperialist nationalism. It has more to do with the decomposition of the old blocs and the disorganization of states that followed it and with the geopolitical conflicts underway. Its mentors and executors, schizophrenic rejects of the Arab ruling classes, are at once integrated into the modern technological world, inhabited by the frustrations and humiliations accumulated by the Arab world in the course of recent centuries, and captivated by the myth of a perfect Islam destroyed by the West. As the organization of the attack and the chosen targets proves, they share the same symbolic values as their former masters. They treat human beings with the same contempt as the market and its “invisible hand,” symbolic abstractions whose value varies depending on whether the corpse lies near Wall Street or in the ruins of Kabul.The end of nationalist and anti-imperialist terrorism has meant the rise of “blowback terrorism.

The unstoppable recession

Before the attack of September 11, 2001, the growth of the American economy-which by itself was responsible for nearly half of world economic growth-had already fallen to zero. Like a “hole in the air,” the attack brutally stopped the economy for a few days, transforming the slowdown into an official recession. Everywhere in the Western world, capitalists are making good use of the situation to accelerate restructuring and announce massive layoffs. In the U.S. alone, hundreds of thousands of jobs have vanished since September 11.

Current events and their consequences need to be considered in the broader framework of capitalist affairs. Inversely, the acceleration of history always clarifies the contradictory mode of functioning of the system. One of the strengths of capitalism is its capacity to recover from crisis situations. Certainly, as Marx noted, in this system each solution constitutes a new problem. But in the mean time, this capacity for reaction shows that, in its contradictory movement, the system has no intrinsic limits. The only limit is the subversion of the social relationships on which it rests.

***
Since the second world war, state intervention into the American economy has not ceased. Military expenditure and subsidies to industry and agriculture remain essential to the functioning of capitalism. In this sense, there has never been a break in practice with Keynesian policy. The neoliberal disengagement of the state has been limited to industrial and financial deregulation, and above all to the dismantling of the welfare state. When, following the attack, the American government, directed by ultra-liberals, was forced to take some measures to save the economy-the injection of millions of dollars into financial circuits and businesses in trouble ; the furnishing of military credits and the enlargement of police forces-it did not deviate from this line. Essentially, the measures taken signified a distribution of money to capitalists, a sort of pillage of public funds, favoring concentration in certain sectors (aviation, for example). In contrast, no Keynesian-style measures to stimulate demand-increases in unemployment relief, public works programs, deprivatization of enterprises-were undertaken.

With respect to monetary policy, the capitalists know that lowering interest rates “works only under certain conditions,” when productive investment increases the social productivity of labor, on which a return to growth depends.

There was, finally, the fatwa of the American administration, the pseudo-moralization of worldwide financial life, promising to dry up the flow of terrorist finance, to control “fiscal paradise” and the circuits of “dirty” money. By a return to financial regulation the big governments are attempting to take back control over the gigantic sums of petrodollars that for years have played a determining role in the stock market and speculative boom, before becoming a factor of instability.

However, although enormous quantities of funds have been injected into the economy and interest rates have reached their lowest level in forty years, the recession is still on. If, as seems to be the case, we are entering into a period of deep recession, this will necessarily lead to deflation and to a massive destruction of capital, to an ever greater social immiseration. The growth of temp work and flexibility in the labor market, the fall of wages, and the recourse to an immigrant labor force without rights, the dismantling of social welfare systems will all be insufficient to reestablish profitability. The measures taken by governments, presented as provisory remedies, will reveal themselves to be a foretaste of a new barbaric social order.

The state monopoly of violence

At first, the interventionist reaction of the American state seems to have comforted the reformist sentiments of the leaders of Attac, the new French group trying to rebuild the old left. “It is always useful to remember that we are not anti-globalists. We have always only stated the reasons why we say that the ultraliberal vision of the United States is not the best passport to the future”, wrote Susan George in Libération (19 September 2001). But we have seen that this neoliberal interventionism has nothing to do with a policy of demand stimulus. The projects of “international financial regulation” were reduced to what was compatible with the opposition of the American banking lobby. Only patriotic repressive laws were rushed into adoption, in both the U.S. and almost everywhere in Europe. The strengthening of state authoritarianism is the unifying element binding neoliberals and Keynesians together. Among the members of Attac, for instance, the demand for a return to a regulatory state goes beyond the economic sphere to social life generally. “Republican citizenship” implies a revaluation of the state as a strong and respected protector. Insecurity and incivility call into question the power of the state and must therefore be combated. The state does its regulatory work and in return the citizens ought to respect the rules of authority.

Analyzing the “laws of modern counter-revolution” in 1941, Karl Korsch stressed that in fighting fascism “by means of its own weapons, liberal democracy was evolving towards authoritarianism, the ideology of the conquered thus suffusing the victors. A half century later, in its struggle against the new terrorism the modern state is itself taking on terrorist forms.

***
Before September 11, 2001, the antiglobalization movement already appeared divided. Its demonstrations left behind a confused message, marked by an increasing division between reformists and the criminalized anticapitalist fringe. The constant recourse to warlike barbarism and the authoritarian evolution of the democratic systems will tend to consolidate this development. The birth of a social movement contesting submission to the “laws of the economy”, starting from the point of exploitation, would be able to unify, in a dynamic of breaking with the past, the energies and potentialities of the anticapitalist antiglobalization networks. Meanwhile, we must insist on the impossibility of reforming capitalism.

Paris, December 2001


L’État-nation et le nationalisme

L’État-nation et le nationalisme

(André Dréan)

En cette fin de siècle, il est difficile de faire l’impasse sur le déferlement d’exigences nationalistes. Le nationalisme semble être devenu l’idéologie de masse la plus partagée dans le monde. Tous les Etats sont aujourd’hui reconnus comme nations même lorsque, à l’évidence, ils ne correspondent pas au modèle de l’Etat-nation qu’ils disent incarner. Rien n’indique que la multiplication des nationalismes et des Etats va prendre fin dans le proche avenir. Ce n’est pas le moindre paradoxe de la triste époque dans laquelle nous vivons : plus que jamais le capitalisme tend à s’affranchir des limites qui l’entravent, en particulier des limites constituées par les frontières. Mais la crise du modèle de l’Etat-nation qui accompagne l’affirmation du caractère supranational du capitalisme, loin d’effriter les fondations du nationalisme paraît au contraire les avoir consolidées. En même temps, le nationalisme d’aujourd’hui, par bien des côtés, n’est pas la simple reconduction de celui d’hier. Pour nous opposer à l’appel empoisonné des nationalistes, quels que soient les costumes de scène qu’ils endossent, nous ne pouvons nous contenter des banalités de base de la critique. Il est nécessaire de réfléchir par nous-mêmes sur la situation sans précédent à laquelle nous sommes confrontés. En ce sens, l’étude d’Hobsbawm, Nations et nationalismes depuis 1780 [1] est l’un des rares livres qui puissent nous donner des indications. Même s’il fleurte parfois trop avec les conceptions des adeptes du matérialisme historique – pour lui, les Etats centralisés comme l’URSS auraient eu au moins le mérite de contenir les tendances séparatistes – il est loin d’en rester à leur rabâchage sclérosé sur cette question maudite. Ici, nous avons choisi de dégager quelques pistes, indispensables à notre propre réflexion.
Le monde à l’envers de l’idéologie nationaliste
Le mérite d’Hobsbawm est de renverser la perspective du nationalisme. Pour les nationalistes, les nations sont des entités, sinon immuables, du moins universelles, qui expriment les besoins génériques des êtres humains d’être associés et identifiés à des communautés historiques stables. Il en découle qu’il serait possible de donner des définitions générales du phénomène national, communes à n’importe quelle phase de l’histoire humaine. La nation pourrait être définie par des critères objectifs (le territoire, la langue, la culture, voire l’économie…) et même par des critères subjectifs (la conscience de partager telles valeurs identitaires, la volonté de les réaliser…). Bref, pour les nationalistes, la nation est définissable a priori et la formation de l’Etat national ne ferait que sanctionner a posteriori l’aspiration populaire à la constituer. Hobsbawm montre qu’il n’en est rien. Le terme même de nation est antédiluvien mais le sens a évolué au cours de l’histoire. Il n’y a rien de commun entre, par exemple, la nation des écoliers de la Sorbonne à l’époque de la Renaissance au XVIe siècle, expression synonyme de corporation, et la nation qui est apparue, à l’époque des révolutions au XVIIIe siècle. En réalité, les nations sont des phénomènes historiques récents. Le monde réel des nations n’a rien à voir avec le monde à l’envers des nationalistes. L’histoire effective montre que, en règle générale, les nations sont façonnées par les Etats et les nationalistes et non l’inverse. Dans l’histoire, l’apparition de l’Etat a précédé celle de la nation mais la notion même d’Etat-nation, plus récente, montre la liaison intime entre les deux. Dissociée de l’Etat, la nation perd toute consistance quelles que soient les tentatives des prétendus nationalistes révolutionnaires pour démontrer le contraire. Du caractère historique du phénomène national, il découle que les fameux critères sont soumis à des révisions presque constantes. En réalité, à chaque crise que traverse l’histoire des nations, c’est la raison d’Etat qui tranche dans le vif.

L’Etat-nation et les jacobins
La nation, au sens moderne du terme, est apparue pour la première fois à l’époque de la Révolution française. Là fut pensée et mise en oeuvre la conception bourgeoise jacobine de l’Etat-nation, en particulier en ce qui concerne les notions de territoire et de frontière. Pour les jacobins, la définition de la nation était liée à celle de l’Etat, Etat territorial, non morcelé et indivisible. Elle reposait sur la souveraineté du peuple, lequel était censé avoir arraché le pouvoir d’Etat des mains de l’individu souverain, le monarque, pour l’exercer par le biais des délégués à la Convention. Le critère de la nationalité était donc la citoyenneté. Hobsbawm souligne avec raison que la conception que les sections de sans-culottes avait de la nation dépassait quelque peu le cadre de la définition jacobine. Car les révolutionnaires des sections étaient hostiles aux aristocrates mais aussi aux bourgeois, accapareurs des biens féodaux, spéculateurs sur les fournitures à l’armée, etc. Ils se considéraient comme le fer de lance de la révolution européenne et aspiraient à l’étendre au-delà des frontières. Les jacobins, eux, héritaient de la centralisation de l’Etat, bien entamée sous la monarchie qui définissait l’Etat comme entité territoriale, limitée par des frontières qui ne recouvraient déjà plus les domaines de l’aristocratie. Ils parachevèrent l’oeuvre centralisatrice de la monarchie. Ils firent de l’Etat-Nation la communauté en quelque sorte générique, face à laquelle les antiques communautés étaient vues comme des entraves à la réalisation de la citoyenneté. Dans leur esprit, le pacte social reposait sur l’adhésion des individus présumés émancipés, les citoyens, aux valeurs de l’Etat républicain. Par suite, pour les étrangers, l’acquisition de la nationalité française était possible, mais selon les modalités de l’assimilation des mêmes valeurs. Les critères culturels, linguistiques, économiques, etc. qui prirent de l’importance par la suite étaient présents à l’époque jacobine. Le manque d’homogénéité entre les citoyens, dans tous les domaines de leur vie non politique, ne pouvait que miner, à long terme, la puissance de l’Etat central. Mais ils étaient subordonnés au critère politique : le statut de citoyen.

La nation et l’économie libérale
Néanmoins, même en France, pour la bourgeoisie de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, la mainmise sur le pouvoir d’Etat n’était que le prélude à la consolidation de la puissance qui lui était propre : l’économie. Dès l’aube de l’industrialisation, les apôtres de l’économie politique, en Angleterre, ne tenaient pas compte des phénomènes nationaux. Pour les plus doctrinaires d’entre eux, même l’existence de territoires limités par des frontières d’Etat apparaissait comme antagonique avec la libre concurrence, condition primordiale de la libre accumulation du capital. Dans leur esprit, le territoire sur lequel le capital global opérait était le marché mondial en cours de constitution, champ de bataille entre les capitaux particuliers. Néanmoins, ils étaient bien obligés de reconnaître que l’accumulation du capital, comme phénomène concret et non pas comme idée abstraite, s’effectuait à partir de pôles déterminés, en gros à partir des Etats-nations d’Europe en formation. En fin de compte, aucun d’entre eux ne niait les avantages que pouvaient présenter les Etats et les colonies qui y étaient rattachées, avantages hérités des guerres mercantiles pour le contrôle du marché mondial entre les monarchies européennes. Les Etats centralisateurs constituaient autant de serres chaudes à l’abri desquelles le capital pouvait proliférer à condition qu’ils en stimulent l’accumulation par des mesures appropriées. Même les libres échangistes les plus fanatiques n’ont jamais voulu détruire les fonctions économiques des Etats. D’où l’invention du concept d’économie nationale pour tenir compte de l’existence des Etats. Hobsbawm a raison d’affirmer que, dans les zones développées du capitalisme, la constitution de nations qui reposaient sur la combinaison Etat-économie nationale fut l’un des phénomènes essentiels du XIXe siècle. Mais la nation était reconnue comme entité viable à condition qu’elle soit compatible avec le progrès, le progrès de l’accumulation et de la centralisation du capital. A l’époque, le principe des nationalités du libéralisme n’était donc pas inconditionnel. Il excluait nombre de zones encore peu touchées par le capitalisme et, en particulier en Europe, des régions qui étaient déjà partie intégrante des Etats centralisés.

Nation et culture
Il est peu connu que les critères culturels, linguistiques et raciaux de la nationalité sont apparus assez tard et qu’ils ne sont devenus décisifs qu’au cours de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, en Europe. Hobsbawm souligne que l’identification de la nationalité à la langue n’a joué à l’origine que pour les lettrés qui, comme dans l’Allemagne morcelée en principautés jusqu’à la constitution du Reich, n’avaient en commun que la langue littéraire, vecteur principal de la diffusion de la culture à prétention nationale, langue qui leur servit ensuite pour investir l’appareil d’Etat. De façon générale, les langues, qui devaient accéder plus tard au statut de langues nationales, ne pouvaient jouer alors que des rôles très modestes, pour ne pas dire nuls, dans la formation de la conscience nationale des illettrés, à peine issus du Moyen Age dans la majeure partie de l’Europe. Il en est de même pour la culture. Il est certain que les nationalistes, pour avoir l’aval des populations qu’ils courtisaient, tentèrent de plus en plus de spéculer sur des traditions, les coutumes, les langues, les religions, etc. auxquelles elles pouvaient parfois s’identifier. De là le mythe nationaliste de la communauté de culture, y compris religieuse, stable et même étrangère au brassage des populations et des cultures. En quelque sorte préétablie, elle n’aurait attendu que des conditions favorables pour apparaître au grand jour sous la forme de l’ Etat national. Hobsbawm rappelle d’ailleurs que, parmi les principaux inventeurs du nationalisme culturel et linguistique, certains provenaient de la maison marxiste confrontée au problème des nationalités dans l’empire d’Autriche-Hongrie en pleine décomposition à la fin du XIXe siècle. Mais, il n’y a pas eu, en règle générale, de continuité entre les facteurs hétérogènes du protonationalisme populaire, comme il l’appelle, et ceux, homogènes, propres à l’Etat-nation. En réalité, les langues nationales furent des créations à moitié artificielles, qui n’avaient parfois que des relations lointaines avec les langues vernaculaires qu’elles prétendaient représenter et standardiser. Leur diffusion était impensable sans la généralisation de l’instruction de masse, bref, sans l’intervention de l’Etat. C’est par la suite, lorsque l’homogénéité en matière de langue et de culture sous l’égide de l’Etat commença à devenir effective, qu’elles devinrent des critères centraux de la définition de la nation.

Le nationalisme comme phénomène de masse
Pour Hobsbawm, il n’est pas question de nier que le nationalisme, au cours de la période qui va de la Commune à la Grande Guerre, ait pu, peu à peu, s’affirmer comme phénomène de masse, en Europe, puis ailleurs. L’élargissement de la base du nationalisme, en particulier de la variante culturelle, linguistique et raciale, était à l’évidence lié à la modification de la structure de classe de la société. L’industrialisation des Etats d’Europe, nationaux ou multinationaux, disloquait ce qui restait de la société antérieure, accélérait le dépeuplement des campagnes et la croissance des villes, engendrait des migrations et des brassages de population sans précédent, etc. En Europe, le nationalisme, dès la fin du XIXe siècle, apparaît de plus en plus comme la réaction des couches moyennes rurales paupérisées, menacées de disparition, et des couches moyennes urbaines déstabilisées par la Grande Dépression de la fin du siècle dernier. De telles couches étaient terrorisées par la montée des classes dangereuses et recherchaient des boucs émissaires pour expliquer leur malheur : les étrangers assimilés parfois à des dangereux révolutionnaires. Le nationalisme trouvait refuge dans les bras des monarchistes, des cléricaux et des racistes qui, tous, communiaient dans la haine de la révolution. Mais les classes dangereuses, en particulier la classe ouvrière, n’étaient pas insensibles à l’appel du nationalisme. Hobsbawm signale l’un des principaux paradoxes de l’époque. La classe ouvrière était certes hostile à la bourgeoisie. Mais elle revendiquait aussi d’être reconnue comme partie intégrante de l’Etat. Les ouvriers aspiraient à bénéficier du statut de citoyen. Or, l’idée de citoyenneté était liée à celle de nationalité, en particulier en France. La démocratisation pouvait donc aider les Etats à résoudre les problèmes d’acquisition de légitimité aux yeux de leurs citoyens, y compris lorsque ces derniers les contestaient. Le nationalisme pour être républicain n’en restait pas moins du nationalisme. La contradiction éclata lorsque, dès la déclaration de guerre, les mêmes ouvriers qui avaient parfois combattu ferme la bourgeoisie furent saisis de ferveur patriotique pour la défense de leur patrie respective. Au début, du moins.

Le wilsonisme et le principe des nationalités
D’après Hobsbawm, la Première Guerre mondiale et la paix de Versailles constituèrent des étapes décisives dans l’histoire du nationalisme. D’abord, les lendemains de Versailles donnèrent l’occasion d’appliquer le principe des nationalités définis par Wilson, principe d’ailleurs partagé par Lénine et les héritiers du marxisme-léninisme. Le principe wilsonien ne différait pas dans le fond du principe libéral. Il exigeait aussi que les frontières d’Etat et les frontières de nationalités, culturelles et linguistiques, coïncident. Mais il abandonnait la notion de seuil : quelle que soit leur taille, les communautés, ainsi définies comme nations potentielles, devaient avoir la possibilité de former l’Etat territorial de leur choix, grâce auquel elles exerceraient leur souveraineté. Hobsbawm fait remarquer avec finesse que l’autodétermination wilsonienne ne fit qu’aggraver la situation. En Europe, elle ne fut mise en oeuvre qu’avec l’accord des Etats victorieux, en règle générale à titre d’Etats tampons contre la poussée révolutionnaire venue de l’Est. Mais, vu l’imbrication des communautés et leur dispersion sur des territoires non connexes, le principe de la coïncidence territoriale entre Etat et nation ne put être réalisé que par la violence intercommunautaire, parfois poussée au paroxysme, associée à celle de l’Etat. Réalisé, le nationalisme des minorités nationales d’Europe apparut aussi réactionnaire que celui des Etats multinationaux dont elles avaient été partie intégrante. Ensuite, les lendemains de Versailles révélèrent l’extention de la zone d’influence du nationalisme aux colonies. Tous ceux qui prétendaient agir au nom des peuples opprimés dans les empires coloniaux parlaient en nationalistes. Hobsbawm montre qu’ainsi, ils adoptaient désormais la langue des Etats oppresseurs qu’ils affirmaient combattre. En réalité, les futurs leaders visaient à constituer des Etats à partir des zones colonisées. Les territoires qu’ils présentaient comme des entités nationales potentielles, en fonction des critères wilsoniens, voire marxistes-léninistes, étaient des créations récentes de la conquête coloniale, en particulier du partage du monde entre les Etats colonisateurs d’Europe, à l’exception notable de la Chine et de quelques autres Etats asiatiques antédiluviens. Les zones coloniales ne pouvaient être identifiées au modèle territorial de l’Etat-nation. Les élites nationalistes, éduquées à l’occidentale, en étaient elles-mêmes à moitié conscientes puisque, comme le rappelle Hobsbawm, elles déploraient l’indifférence, voire l’hostilité, envers l’idée nationale des populations qui étaient l’objet de leur propagande. Elles attribuaient leur échec à la politique des colonisateurs qui utilisaient le tribalisme millénaire des peuples colonisés. Mais le succès relatif du << diviser pour régner << prouvait a contrario que l'attachement des diverses populations n'allait pas encore à la communauté nationale imaginée par les élites mais aux multiples formes de communautés traditionnelles. Néanmoins, avec la pénétration du capitalisme dans les colonies et la décomposition concomitante de telles communautés, des réactions, parfois insurrectionnelles, contre les oppresseurs étrangers et les compradores locaux commencèrent à apparaître. Les nationalistes avaient désormais la possibilité d'utiliser le potentiel de révolte à condition de modifier quelque peu leur programme et leur langage. Il devenait indispensable de tenir compte des aspirations confuses des populations s'ils voulaient leur faire jouer le rôle de chair à canon de l'idéal national.

Marxisme-léninisme et nationalisme radical
Pour Hobsbawm, la victoire apparente de la révolution russe fut décisive sur le cours du nationalisme. La participation de l'URSS et des partis qui lui étaient inféodés à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, présentée comme guerre de libération contre le fascisme, l'assimilation du fascisme à la trahison de la nation, en particulier en France, etc. accéléraient les retrouvailles entre le nationalisme et le marxisme-léninisme. En effet, les nationalistes qui aspiraient à créer des Etats indépendants ne pouvaient manquer de voir dans les prétendus Etats socialistes, qui affirmaient être les défenseurs de toutes les nations opprimées par les Etats impérialistes, leurs alliés privilégiés. Même en Europe, les séparatistes en vinrent à adopter l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste qui tranchait avec leur généalogie, marquée par leur association avec le cléricalisme, le royalisme et même le fascisme. Elle leur permettait de troquer leurs costumes défraîchis pour ceux de nationalistes révolutionnaires, plus aptes à capter l'attention des populations désorientées dans la mesure où ils leur promettaient de combiner libération nationale et sociale. Même ceux qui n'étaient pas inféodés à Moscou apparaissaient ainsi sur la scène de la lutte contre l'impérialisme, en particulier celle contre l'hégémonisme américain, bien que, dans la réalité, ils n'aient jamais voulu autre chose que l'adaptation du modèle de l'Etat-nation aux conditions locales au sein desquelles ils opéraient. La suite le prouva à l'évidence. La décolonisation, même lorsqu'elle ne fut pas réalisée avec la bénédiction des Etats coloniaux, mais à la suite de révoltes avortées, comme en Algérie, montra quel était le sens réel de leur phraséologie révolutionnaire : prendre le pouvoir d'Etat et tenter de construire à l'échelle locale, sur la base de la nationalisation de secteurs clés de l'économie, quelque chose d'assez proche en principe du modèle européen de l'économie nationale. Dans la plupart des cas, de telles mesures ne permirent même pas d'améliorer la situation des populations concernées et d'échapper à la tutelle des maîtres du marché mondial. Pour le reste, comme les Etats issus de la décolonisation étaient assis sur des mosaïques de communautés culturelles, linguistiques, religieuses ancestrales, ils héritaient de toutes leurs contradictions, en particulier des luttes entre chefs de clan pour monopoliser le pouvoir, sans compter les multiples frictions entre Etats liées à la rectification des frontières coloniales.

Le nationalisme aujourd'hui
A l'aube du troisième millénaire, marquée par l'implosion de l'Etat soviétique et des Etats satellites, il paraît étrange qu'Hobsbawm insiste sur le déclin du nationalisme. C'est que, face à la multiplication d'Etats à prétention nationale et à l'exacerbation des haines nationales, il tient à souligner l'impasse que constitue le modèle de l'Etat-nation. La nation, qui passe toujours pour quelque chose de très concret, est en réalité devenue très abstraite. L'identification à la représentation nationale est de plus en plus imaginaire et personne, pas plus les simples citoyens que les chefs d'Etat, n'est capable d'expliquer ce que l'appartenance nationale veut dire, sinon l'exclusion d'autrui. L'Etat-nation et le nationalisme sont en crise, en particulier dans leur version wilsonienne et marxiste-léniniste, crise d'ailleurs à moitié avouée par les leaders nationalistes qui abandonnent peu à peu, sous n'importe quelle lattitude, les références précédentes, en particulier le couple Etat-économie nationale, pour spéculer sur des identifications, plus ou moins effectives, à l'ethnie, à la culture, à la langue, à la religion, voire à la race. Car, vu les mutations catastrophiques et sans précédent du capitalisme mondial, les composantes traditionnelles du nationalisme, la composante économique en premier lieu, qui favorisaient l'identification des populations à leur Etat perdent de leur force même si elles ne disparaissent pas en totalité. La mondialisation accélérée du capital, sur fond de désagrégation et de transformation rapides des structures sociales, permet à ce dernier de transgresser les limites des Etats nationaux. Il favorise même la multiplication de minuscules Etats, voire d'Etats-cités comme Singapour, qui sont des pôles d'accumulation et de circulation des capitaux. Par suite, il ne reste pas grand-chose du programme nationaliste sinon de très vagues références à des communautés et à des traditions plus ou moins inventées et parfois l'illusion de pouvoir renouer avec le modèle préwilsonien. Voilà ce qui distingue les fondamentalistes religieux des nationalistes laïques. Les fondamentalismes ont aujourd'hui le vent en poupe comme idéologies de substitution à la faillite du mythe du progrès, y compris dans la version marxiste-léniniste du progrès émancipateur. Les fondamentalistes ont la prétention de revenir aux valeurs figées des origines mythiques, en principe du moins. Ils prétendent donc donner des réponses précises aux questions angoissantes de l'époque. Mais, comme l'indique Hobsbawm, aujourd'hui, l'absence même de programme précis des diverses variantes du nationalisme jouent en leur faveur. Au point que, en Europe même, n'importe quelle revendication locale, régionale, voire sectorielle contre la bureaucratie de l'Etat central, est susceptible, dès qu'elle le peut, d'endosser le costume national, de préférence dans la version culturelle et linguistique. En réalité, le nationalisme est le catalyseur de phénomènes plus profonds. Il est sans cesse alimenté par la désorientation des populations, traumatisées et parfois acculées à la simple survie par l'évolution catastrophique du capitalisme à l'échelle planétaire, atomisées et déracinées, avides de repères grâce auxquelles elles puissent donner sens à leur vie, du moins la supporter quelque peu. Là, les antiques relations familiales, claniques, tribales, etc. peuvent jouer des rôles d'identification bien que, dans la réalité, elles soient depuis belle lurette ravagées par l'économie, absorbées par elle et servent même de base à la constitution de mafias comme le montre l'exemple des groupes séparatistes dans l'ex-empire soviétique. L'identification nationale, l'intégrisme national même, quelles que soient les justifications délirantes qu'il puisse inventer, y compris religieuses, a alors pour fonction essentielle de désigner les boucs émissaires, les étrangers qui, comme étrangers, sont des ennemis en puissance et qui, à notre époque héritière de l'industrialisation forcenée des Trente Glorieuses, campent même au coeur des Etats d'Europe. D'où le fond commun de toutes les variantes du nationalisme d'aujourd'hui : la xénophobie. Tous les Etats ont donc la partie facile pour persécuter les étrangers, les chasser, fermer leurs frontières, etc. même si, avec l'accélération de la mondialisation, ils sont en train de perdre des pans entiers de leurs fonctions traditionnelles.

La France et le nationalisme
Nous ne pouvons conclure cette brève approche sans aborder la situation à laquelle nous sommes confrontés en France, situation que Hobsbawm ne fait qu'effleurer. En France aujourd'hui, il est de bon ton, face à la poussée de xénophobie de type fasciste, avec les connotations racistes qui lui sont propres, d'assimiler nationalisme et fascisme. Pour lutter contre la xénophobie, sanctionnée et aggravée par les mesures du pouvoir d'Etat, qui accentue l'antagonisme entre présumés nationaux et présumés étrangers, il faudrait affirmer l'intangibilité des principes de la démocratie. Tel est le credo de l'opposition spectaculaire à la menace fasciste, fascisme qu'elle réduit d'ailleurs de façon étroite à celui du parti de Le Pen. Mais c'est oublier, ou faire mine d'oublier, que les fameuses valeurs universelles de la citoyenneté, y compris en matière d'assimilation, sont en réalité singulières, caractéristiques de l'Etat-Nation tel qu'il s'est constitué en France au cours de l'histoire récente. Ce sont des valeurs nationales. C'est oublier aussi que leur réalisation a toujours été très élastique, subordonnée en priorité aux nécessités de l'économie nationale et de la raison d'Etat. Elles ont donc toujours été très restrictives, à l'exception de brèves périodes de l'histoire comme celle des Trente Glorieuses, où le capital national avait besoin de la force de travail d'origine étrangère, en provenance des colonies et des néocolonies. Brandir le drapeau défraîchi de la prétendue république universelle contre tel et tel parti, tel et tel leader, même aussi démagogue que Le Pen, qui affirme lui aussi représenter les valeurs de la république, c'est, au mieux, ne rien comprendre à l'Etat-nation et aux sources du nationalisme contemporain, c'est, au pire, partager les mêmes valeurs fondamentales. Pour preuve, il n'y a qu'à voir l'influence des idées de ce démagogue non seulement chez les paysans et les boutiquiers, base habituelle de l'ultranationalisme en France, mais aussi chez ce qui reste des ouvriers. La communauté de la classe ouvrière, qui s'était constituée avec l'industrialisation du pays, est en cours de dislocation, sur fond de crise du travail liée à la relative désindustrialisation. Or, en France, les valeurs de classe, malgré le potentiel de révolte qu'elles peuvent encore symboliser, sont depuis longtemps liées aux valeurs de l'Etat-nation, protecteur de l'industrie nationale. Là, les thèmes sur la décadence nationale rencontrent des échos certains parce qu'ils correspondent à l'idée que ce font les ouvriers français de leur propre décadence comme facteur indispensable à la mise en valeur du capital national. Entre la défense de l'économie nationale et la défense de la nation, il n'y a pas aujourd'hui de muraille de Chine, pas plus qu'il n'y en avait hier entre le socialisme national et le national socialisme. Les apôtres de la démocratie, parfois situés dans la militance à prétention révolutionnaire, font mine de ne pas comprendre la généalogie du fascisme comme phénomène de masse. Ils dénoncent même parfois le parti ultranationaliste de Le Pen comme celui de la trahison des traditions républicaines de la France et cherchent à réchauffer l'idéologie putréfiée de la résistance nationaliste au fascisme. Ils ne sauraient mieux avouer que le couple démocratie-nation est indissociable et dévoiler sur quelles bases ils comptent diriger et encadrer le spectacle de la résistance à genoux contre la montée du fascisme. De plus, face à l'autoritarisme du pouvoir d'Etat, les déçus de la centralisation dans les régions périphériques sont quelque peu sensibles aux appels de sirène des autonomistes, voire des séparatistes. La désertification engendrée par la centralisation de l'économie, en particulier dans le domaine de la culture, relèverait de la responsabilité exclusive du pouvoir central. Face à la standardisation générale de la survie, de plus en plus atomisée, désespérée et vide de sens, le besoin de trouver des repères et de renouer avec la sociabilité passe par la valorisation de prétendues cultures particulières qui, en règle générale, sont présentées comme des traces de traditions populaires bridées par l'Etat. Et les gens qui y trouvent refuge sont prêts à oublier ce que de telles traditions avaient d'exclusif, de borné et d'autoritaire. Les naïfs partisans des leaders séparatistes jurent qu'il n'est question pour eux que de culture, rien que de culture. Mais, en l'occurrence, la culture est la poursuite de la politique par d'autres moyens. L'apologie des différences culturelles apparaît comme l'un des moyens essentiels pour les mobiliser derrière de tels leaders qui aspirent à conquérir du pouvoir, y compris par la violence, dans leurs zones d'influence régionales respectives et, bien entendu, à faire des affaires dans le cadre de l'Europe. Le pouvoir d'Etat, fidèle à la tradition jacobine, est agacé par de telles gesticulations nationalistes. En même temps, il est prêt à lâcher du lest, voire à donner libre champ à certaines mafias nationalistes comme le montre l'exemple de la Corse. Désormais, le relativisme culturel est étendu aussi aux communautés d'immigrés originaires du Tiers-Monde. Sans nier les facteurs de solidarité qu'elles peuvent encore posséder, nous ne pouvons pas fermer les yeux sur leurs côtés bornés, en particulier leur hiérarchie de type patriarcale, sur lesquels prennent appui les nationalistes, des derniers marxistes-léninistes aux intégristes musulmans. En France, elles apparaissent comme des valeurs refuges parce que le pouvoir d'Etat, en vertu du principe jacobin de l'assimilation individuelle, les persécute comme telles. Mais de là à en faire des pôles de résistance radicale à l'Etat !

* * *
En France comme ailleurs, le nationalisme est moins que jamais susceptible d'apporter des solutions aux questions de fond que soulève l'évolution catastrophique de la société contemporaine. En règle générale, il détourne les individus, même ceux qui sont quelque peu révoltés par la condition qui leur est faite, de l'essentiel : la lutte contre le capitalisme. Il les illusionne sur la possibilité d'améliorer leur survie à condition qu'ils acceptent d'être identifiés aux diverses communautés nationales offertes sur le marché de l'idéologie, présentées de façon mythifiée et nostalgique comme autant de traces palpables de sociabilité précapitaliste. En réalité, de telles communautés, sous la houlette des leaders nationalistes, les dominent, les utilisent et, en fin de compte, les privent de liberté. Nous sommes pour que les individus reprennent le chemin de la communauté, qui a déjà existé dans l'histoire de l'humanité, y compris en Europe, dans l'histoire récente, à travers les combats contre le capital et l'Etat. En ce sens, pas plus aujourd'hui qu'hier, les individus révoltés ne partent de rien pour réaliser leurs objectifs et leurs rêves. Ils prennent appui sur leur histoire. Mais la conquête de la liberté, liberté à la fois individuelle et collective, reste la condition primordiale de la sociabilité retrouvée. Lorsque la liberté est absente, la communauté n'a plus de sens. Elle est synonyme de domination.

NOTE :
(1) – Editions Gallimard, Bibliothèque des histoires, 1992.